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This
page considers global and national data interception.
It covers -
The
antecedents and shape of Echelon are discussed here.
introduction
[under development]
Australia
[under development]
New
Zealand
[under development]
United
Kingdom
Until 1985, the interception of communications by the
state was wholly outside the law. The official position
was that such eavesdropping took place only on the authority
of a warrant issued by the secretary of state when it
was needed for the detection of serious crime or for safeguarding
the security of the state. Even then, various other procedural
hurdles had (supposedly) to be negotiated. But there was
no mechanism for ensuring that the state stayed within
its own rules, and the 1970s and early 1980s were full
of rumours of excess on the part of MI5, directed at CND,
the trade unions (especially the NUM) as well as more
obvious Cold War opponents. The purpose behind all this
surveillance, in the national security arena at least,
was not to build a case against suspects under the ordinary
criminal law: it was pure intelligence gathering, intended
to inform the advance planning of state strategists, to
disrupt the operations of the other side, or to permit
the effective conducting of psychological games and the
playing of dirty tricks. There was never any question
of using the material in court.
This approach had to change when legal regulation was
forced on the authorities by a decision of the European
Court of Human Rights, in the case of Malone v. United
Kingdom (1985). The Interception of Communication Act
1985 that followed put the whole matter on a legal basis,
setting out various criteria for lawful interceptions
and providing a measure of accountability, but at the
same time going to immense trouble to exclude the courts
from any meaningful role in the process. Officials were
worried not only about their now lawful intercepts being
referred to in court, but about their continuing illegal
operations being held against them. Amazingly, Section
9 of the act provided that in any proceedings before a
court no evidence was to be adduced and no questions were
to be asked in cross-examination which tended to suggest
that an interception had taken place, with or without
a warrant.
This continued insulation of surveillance from the disciplines
of the criminal process was controversial almost from
the start. Judges didn’t like it, particularly when
terrorism came to replace Communism as the bogey-man in
chief. In 1996, in a report which was otherwise sympathetic
to the authorities, Lord Lloyd of Berwick called for a
reform in the law to allow such evidence to be led in
national security cases. Not only did the government reject
this view, it re-enacted the prohibition in the Regulation
of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.
Canada
[under development]
United
States
[under development]
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